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AN INTEGRATION OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
Richard 0. Zerbe Jr.*
Policy analysts have long recognized that both efficiency and equity
are relevant for decisions. Because both are seen as components of
justice, judges and policymakers are presumed to take both efficiency
and equity into account in their decisions. The aim of integrating
efficiency and equity is thus not generally at issue. The question is how
to do it in a useful way.
Swygert and Yanes, in an article in this issue of the Washington Law
Review, suggest a means to achieve this integration.' In this Article, I
first discuss the shortcomings of the approach suggested by Swygert and
Yanes. Next, I suggest a more practical approach for integrating
efficiency and equity that relies on benefit cost analysis. Finally, I
consider some of the cases to which Swygert and Yanes apply their
analysis. The fundamental shortcoming of the Swygert and Yanes
approach is that it offers little for deciding practical cases. The authors
combine two abstract and heuristic proposals and quite naturally end up
with an abstract approach that is uncertain in its application.
In this response, I show that benefit cost analysis, a well-established
technique for determining whether a decision is efficient, is also
applicable to equity considerations. Indeed, I show that the distinction
between efficiency and equity is artificial. The expanded efficiency
approach I suggest remedies the defects in the Swygert and Yanes
approach and offers a more practical alternative for integrating efficiency
and equity.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THE SWYGERT AND YANES APPROACH
Swygert and Yanes invoke the Coase Theorem, with its world of zero
transaction costs, along with Rawlsean ideas of justice, particularly the
concept of the initial position, as rhetorical devices to aid in thinking
*Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; Professor, University of
Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs. I would like to thank Patrick Dobel for useful
suggestions.
1. Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of
Fairness into Efficiency, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 249 (1998).
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about actions that satisfy both efficiency and equity. Although these
rhetorical devices are useful in thinking about efficiency and equity, the
concepts of a zero-transaction-cost world and a world of an initial
position are too abstract to allow much of an improvement to existing
thinking about equity and efficiency.
Consider first the Coase Theorem as a device for deciding efficiency.2
The Coase Theorem applies to the world of zero transaction costs and
perfect knowledge.3 Such a world guarantees economic efficiency as
long as rights are well specified. With zero transaction costs, all
profitable trades will be made.4
In the real world where transaction costs do exist, the Coase Theorem
has limited applicability.5 The rule that results in economic efficiency
when transaction costs are very low is not necessarily the rule that results
in efficiency when transaction costs are high. For example, when
transaction costs are low, the efficient rule may be one that promotes
bargaining. When transaction costs are high, the efficient rule is more
likely to put the burden of action on the party that can make efficient
adjustments more cheaply. In focusing on the Coase Theorem, Swygert
and Yanes lose sight of what efficiency is. Not surprisingly, then, the
authors are unclear about whether they refer to Pareto efficiency or the
Kaldor-Hicks (KH) efficiency (also called wealth maximization).6
Similar difficulties arise when Swygert and Yanes introduce Rawls's
theories of justice as the vehicle to consider equity issues. The authors
invoke Rawls's approach because they believe it generates constructive
empathy by the assumption of risk aversion in an initial position! The
initial position, originally defined by Harsanyi and not by Rawls, is one
in which individuals make decisions about fundamental rules of society
2. For an extended discussion of the Coase Theorem, see Steven Medema & Richard Zerbe, The
Coase Theorem, in The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
DeGeest eds., forthcoming 1998).
3. Id. The Coase Theorem does not define economic efficiency nor does it suggest what actions
are efficient.
4. Initial rights determine a wealth floor in the Coase Theorem world because no one would agree
to a bargain that makes him or her worse off. With zero transaction costs, everyone is part of every
bargain.
5. Coase's purpose was to draw attention to the role of transaction costs, not to develop an
economic theory based on zero transaction costs. See Medema & Zerbe, supra note 2.
6. Pareto efficiency is achieved when no one is made worse off and at least one person is made
better off. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17 (defining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
7. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 78 (1971).
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without knowing their own places in society.' The underlying notion is
that rules will be fair if the person making the rules does not know his or
her future position.
Rawls offers even less practical help in equity considerations than the
Coase Theorem offers in efficiency calculations. The Swygert and Yanes
approach begs the question of when the initial position should be
invoked in legal decisions. If matters at law are generally decided as if
the parties are in an initial position, established rights may be ignored,
thereby causing results that are neither fair nor efficient.
Moreover, Swygert and Yanes assume that those in an initial position
will be risk averse. This assumption means that any transfers from richer
or poorer will be accepted in an initial position. The Swygert and Yanes
discussion of risk aversion in a Rawlsean context confuses the matter.
They should just recognize the empathy implicit in an initial position
and forego the discussion of risk aversion. The initial position simply
creates a situation in which risk considerations are relevant because the
decisionmaker needs to take into account the fates of all. These risk
considerations play the same role as empathy and are unnecessary once
empathy is introduced. The initial position does not change the level of
risk aversion that people actually have.9
Swygert and Yanes also invoke Rawls's min-max notion, according to
which an action, to be justified, must increase the well-being of the
least well-off person, subject to maintenance of basic rights and liberties.
This principle, however, assumes infinite risk aversion. This is not the
level of risk aversion that people actually exhibit. Nor is this assumption
compatible with economic efficiency insofar as it is an incorrect
assumption about people's actual preferences-whether or not they are
in an initial position. The presumption that individuals behind a veil of
8. John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking, 61
J. Pol. Econ. 434, 434-35 (1953). In Harsanyi's treatment, the individual recognizes that he or she
has an equal chance of being anyone in society. Rawls's concept of the original position is similar
but with greater restriction of what one knows in this position (the veil of ignorance). See Rawls,
supra note 7, at 78.
9. Indeed, Vickrey has shown that (contrary to Swygert and Yanes's assumption) people will
maximize expected utility in an original position even assuming risk aversion. William Vickrey,
Measuring Marginal Utility by Reductions in Risks, 13 Econometrica 319, 330 (1945). Expected
utility simply includes risk aversion. Id.
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ignorance will choose equality empirically appears not to be necessarily
correct. 0
Suppose, for example, that Bill Gates and the poorest member of
society enter into a bargain in which the poorest member will perform
yard work for five dollars per hour. After the poorest member has
performed 160 hours of work worth $800, a lawyer for the poorest
member sues Gates on the grounds that the bargain between Gates and
the poorest member would not have been made if both were in an initial
position. Instead the wage would have been at least $100 per hour, the
minimum wage on which the two parties would agree in bargaining from
an initial position. Gates thus owes the poorest member at least $16,000,
a result neither efficient nor fair. How would Swygert and Yanes
distinguish this case from that of Walker-Thomas Furniture," which they
cite? 2 The alternative that I suggest provides an answer.
Finally, Swygert and Yanes mistakenly rely on the traditional
separation of equity and efficiency to support their proposed approach.
Economic efficiency has generally been thought to be separate from
equity issues such as the distribution of income. Charles Fried's views
are representative. 3 According to Fried, economic analysis of rights uses
a concept of efficiency that is removed from distributional questions.
Thus, because economic analysis does not consider whether the
distribution is fair or just, the fact that a given outcome is efficient does
not give it "any privileged claim to our approbation."' 4 Similarly, Posner
notes, "[T]here is for good or ill nothing in the ethic of wealth
maximization which says that society has a duty to help the needy ....
In this regard, wealth maximization is at one with individualist political
philosophy, but both are out of phase with powerful currents of
contemporary moral feeling....""
10. Ed Bukszar & Jack L. Knetsch, Fragile Redistribution's Choices Behind a Veil of Ignorance,
14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 63, 72 (1997).
11. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
12. In both cases, Swygert and Yanes assume risk aversion, which is what drives their result.
13. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 93 (1978).
14. Id. at 94.
15. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol'y 85, 101 (1985) [hereinafter Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited]. Posner's inconsistency in
defining economic efficiency and his use of it on occasion in a utilitarian manner has led one
commentator to refer to Posner's approach to law and economics as "quasi-scientific mysticism."
Robin Paul Malloy, Letters from the Longhouse: Law, Economics and Native American Values,
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1569, 1621. Elsewhere Posner has noted that wealth maximization is the same
thing as KH efficiency. Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision Making,
Vol. 73:349, 1998
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These assumptions are profoundly wrong because they ignore both the
nature of a good in economic analysis and what I call "the regard we
have for others" that is an integral part of economic efficiency. Because
these assumptions are common throughout much of the legal and
economic literature, one can understand why Swygert and Yanes rely on
them. Nevertheless, these assumptions fail to consider carefully the
nature of economic efficiency.
Economic efficiency for policy purposes is Kaldor-Hicks (KH)
efficiency. KH efficiency says (approximately) that a change is efficient
when the winners from the change could, in principle, compensate the
losers.' 6 No actual compensation need take place to ensure that a change
satisfies the KH test. The gains to winners are measured by their
willingness to pay (WTP) for them. Losses are to be measured by the
losers' willingness to accept (WTA) payment as compensation for the
loss. Thus, a change is efficient when the sum of the WTPs for the
change exceed the sum of the WTAs for the change across all people
who care about the change. 7
A "good" in economic analysis is defined by what people care about.
They care about equity. People care about the fairness and efficiency of
rules, for example, so that these attributes of decisions are also economic
"goods." They will often care not just about the cost of a project but also
4 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 131, 135 (1984); see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 13
(4th ed. 1992).
16. See Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. & Dwight D. Dively, Benefit Cost Analysis in Theory and Practice
96-98 (1994).
17. The concept of KH efficiency is well captured in the following example:
You are asked to compare two worlds. The first is the status quo: the world the way it is now.
The second is identical with the status quo except for the change brought about by the project. In
the comparison, you take into account the ramifications of the project, differences in income to
you and others, differences in habitat, and so on; but except for the changes brought on by the
project, the two worlds are the same.
Suppose that you value the first world more highly than the second .... Then you are asked
what is the minimum you need to be compensated so that you would value the change (with the
compensation) just as much as the status quo. If you value the world with the project more than
the status quo, then you are asked how big a payment you could make in the changed world
(with the project) so that you would just value equally the status quo .... The economic
criterion says that if the sum of all the compensations (to those who would lose by the project) is
less than the sum of the equilibrating payments (from the gainers from the project), then the
change from the status quo is worth making.
Talbott Page, Environmental Existentialism, in Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental
Management 97, 102 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 1992). See generally W.A.S. Hewins, Economics,
in 7 Encyclopadia Britannica 899, 900 (1 lth ed. 1911).
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who pays for the project, and whether the beneficiaries are deserving.
They will care about the income distribution. For these reasons, equity is
a logical part of economic efficiency. For any good that people care
about, we can in principle determine an aggregate WTP to obtain that
good and an aggregate WTP.to give up the good. Since people care about
equity and fairness," there will be a K- test that can be applied to
fairness, to equity, and to the income distribution. Thus, the concept of
economic efficiency applies to considerations of fairness and to equity. 9
II. A MORE PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE
Benefit cost analysis is a well-established technique for determining
the KH efficiency of public projects. If equity can be shown to be a part
of efficiency, then a long-standing and practical technique is made
available to consider equity aspects of public policy. As a matter of logic,
economic efficiency necessarily includes equity considerations."0 This
integration I have called "Kaldor-Hicks-Zerbe" (KHZ) efficiency.
Because economic efficiency has practical application, so does equity
when considered as part of economic efficiency.2'
Notice that the KH test includes the sentiments of all of those who
care about the proposed change(s). Thus, the test includes what I call
"the regard of others." People will care about others or about outcomes
even when they themselves are not otherwise directly affected. The
regard of some for the social welfare of others is well established." One
expression of the concern for others arises when we are concerned about
the appropriate application of principles of justice in situations in which
we ourselves are not directly affected. Empathy logically plays an
18. According to Mayr, an eminent evolutionary biologist, people will care about others, even
others to whom they are not related. See generally Ernst Mayr, This Is Biology (1997).
19. See Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., Is Benefit Cost Legal? Three Rules for Benefit Cost Analysis, 17
J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. (forthcoming 1998). The major treatment is given in Richard 0. Zerbe
Jr., The Foundations of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency in Law and Economics: On the Kindness of
Strangers (University of Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs & School of Law Working
Paper in Public Policy Analysis and Management No. 97-11, 1997) [hereinafter Zerbe,
Foundations].
20. Zerbe, Foundations, supra note 19.
21. See supra note 19. Posner points out that in economics, wealth is not just money wealth.
Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, supra note 15, at 86-87.
22. See generally Fay Lomax Cook & Edith J. Barrett, Support for the American Welfare State:
The Views of Congress and the Public (1992); Fay Lomax Cook, Who Should Be Helped: Public
Support for Social Services (1979).
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important role in KH efficiency. The separation between efficiency and
equity is then convenient but artificial.
As long as the income distribution is valued, it will be one of the
goods that must be considered in the choice between the status quo world
and the changed world. In terms of KH, a change in income distribution
has a value, positive or negative, that can be determined by the WTP or
the WTA and in this respect is like any other good. To illustrate, ask
yourself if you would pay one dollar to live in a world in which income
inequality was less by fifty percent than in the present world, without
otherwise affecting your own income or total income. If you answer yes,
you have indicated a WTP for the change. You and others will care
whether an additional dollar is received by, say, Bill Gates or by the
poorest member of society, and KH requires that this regard be counted.
Posner speaks about the problem in which, "if the initial allocation is
thought unjust, the change, while increasing the wealth of the society,
may actually be carrying it further away from the just allocation." Yet if
we care about justice, the change is in fact not KIt efficient unless the
gain in other forms of wealth is sufficient to offset income distributional
consequences of projects as well as social norms generally. Thus, the
distributional effects of a policy can be treated like any other good for
which there is a WTP or WTA and incorporated into a benefit cost
analysis. 4
The basis of benefit cost analysis is the KH criteria. Benefit cost
analysis incorporates well-developed techniques to determine economic
efficiency. By incorporating equity into the traditional calculation of
benefits and costs, a practical and established approach that I call "KHZ
efficiency" is available to consider equity effects. KH and Pareto
efficiency take into account equity and fairness. They take into account
the sentiments of others.
The goal is to have decisionmakers act impartially in treating parties
instead of considering parties as if they are in an initial position." In the
23. Richard A. Posner, The Justice of Economics, Economia Delle Schelte Pubbliche 15, 23
(1987).
24. Although the KH criteria assume that a dollar is worth the same to all, individuals may
consider the different capacities of enjoyment that others have, and this may be incorporated into
their WTP or WTA for others. See the commentary of the Biscuit on the relative capacities of the
rich T. Patterson Frisby and the poor Biscuit to enjoy income. Pelham G. Wodehouse, Big Money
177-78 (Penguin Books 1953) (1931).
25. Swygert and Yanes create a modification of Rawls's original position that is in fact the same
as Harsanyi's initial position. I will therefore refer to the "initial position."
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real world, judges make decisions that take into account this expanded
concept of efficiency. Judges act according to a norm, a norm that
expects them to dispense justice; they use the language of justice. One
example from the Irish Land Law of 1881 is illustrative. In Gilmore v.
M'Kelvey,26 the court uses the language of justice, illustrates the regard
for others, and shows concern for the income distribution. The court
states:
With respect to the question of value, the court is perfectly
unanimous. One can not help having a certain feeling with respect
to a gentleman who having in 1878 voluntarily and without
coercion taken a couple of fields outside the town from a lady, not
very wealthy, at a rent of £30 a year, comes in the year 1882, and
seeks to get a perpetuity in that land as against her at a rent of £12
15s. I have no doubt Mr. Gilmore reconciled himself to the
transaction, but there are many people who would not.27
Consider a hypothetical project to remove a dam on the Elwha river in
Washington State. This project will materially enhance fishing
possibilities but will result in higher electricity rates for certain rich
residents of a nearby city. Many of those who will benefit from the
greater fishing possibilities are poor or of middle income level. Table 1
shows hypothetical net gains and losses by income group as measured by
the aggregate WTP or WTA (for losses) by group. Table 1 tells us that
fifty million dollars is the measure of the gain to those in the bottom one-
third of the income distribution. This is measured by the aggregate WTP
of those poor people affected by the project. The sum of fifty million
dollars is the aggregate value of dam removal for those in the bottom
one-third of the income distribution. This project does not pass a
traditional efficiency test as shown in the column "total net benefits,"
which shows negative net benefits of one million dollars.
26. See E.O. MacDevitt, Land Cases, Being a Collection of Reports of Decisions Under the Irish
LandActs Since the Passing of the Land Law (Ireland) Act 201 (1884).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
356
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Income poor middle rich total net
Group income benefits
Net +50 +29 -80 -1
Benefits
This test can be expanded to take into account the sentiments of
others. Suppose that others care positively about transfers to the poor.
The question is how much others are willing to pay for the gain to the
poor. Assume that income gains to the poor are valued by others. What
value would these gains have to others? What one is willing to pay for a
good is always limited to what one must pay for a perfect substitute. In
this case, the substitute good is the most efficient purely distributional
project that accomplishes the same distributional purpose. Harberger
suggests that, at most, the administrative costs of transferring money to
the poor by the most efficient method available are twenty percent of the
amount of the money transferred.28 A transfer of fifty million dollars to
the poor, therefore, would cost ten million. That is, we can say that, at
most, the measure of the value of income gains by the poor to others is
ten million dollars. Call this the transfer benefit. Table 2 shows the
benefit cost calculation including the transfer benefit.
Table 2
Combining Narrow Efficiency and Equity into General Efficiency
(millions of dollars)
Income poor middle rich transfer total net
Group income benefits benefits
Net +50 +29 -80 +10 +9
Benefits
28. Anold C. Harberger, On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, 86
J. Pol. Econ. S87-S120 (1978).
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By considering the value of the distributional change to others, a
project that at first appeared inefficient now proves to be efficient. We
have evaluated the improvement of the income distribution on the same
basis as other goods. The project is an efficient way to transfer income to
the poor.
III. COMPARING THE SWYGERT AND YANES APPROACH
WITH THE KALDER-HICKS-ZERBE APPROACH FOR
LEGAL DECISIONS
Swygert and Yanes consider a series of legal decisions for which they
claim their approach produces superior results. Yet all of these cases can
be analyzed more effectively from the standpoint of expanded efficiency.
The initial position adds no more information in these cases than already
provided by efficiency analysis.
One class of cases considered by Swygert and Yanes involves
gratuitous promises for benefits previously received. In these cases, a
promisor makes an offer to reward a deserving person for having
performed a deserving act of value to the promisor. The promise is,
however, not enforceable since there is no contract. Swygert and Yanes
believe that efficiency is not a sufficient consideration to yield this result
because the promisor gains nothing. The act the promisor appreciates is
performed in any event.
In an initial position, according to Swygert and Yanes, the promise
must be enforceable because either party could foresee being the injured
promisee. That is, Swygert and Yanes assume that the compensation is
worth more to the promisee than to the promisor. In economic terms
there is declining marginal utility of income.
If compensation is, in general, worth more to promisees than to
promisors, then it is efficient to require compensation. It is not the initial
position that needs to be invoked, just the actual situation that includes
further promisors and promisees. Consider a proposed law that would
make liable one who avoids harm as a result of an action of a deserving
person. The law would make the person liable for damages incurred by
the deserving person in performing the harm-reducing action up to the
value of the harm avoided. Suppose further that no additional acts of
kindness (saving others from harm) will be produced by this law, so that
it is not efficient in the sense used by Swygert and Yanes. People will
recognize that additional money is worth more to them in the situation of
the promisee than the promisor. The WTP for the change in the law will
exceed the WTA of those opposed, and the change will be efficient.
Vol. 73:349, 1998
An Integration of Equity and Efficiency
Even if the income were worth the same for both parties, people may
see a requirement of enforceable promises in this situation as fair. The
prevailing sentiment will be in favor if enough people feel strongly
enough that payment is fair. Then, again, the proposed change in the law
will simply be efficient by definition. That is, the aggregate WTP to
make the legal change will exceed the WTA of those against the change.
Insofar as individuals regard this proposal as fair, this will be reflected in
their WTP for it. Thus, the change may be efficient, but there is no need
to invoke the initial position.29 The key assumption is the declining
marginal utility of income, not the initial position.3"
Use of the initial position in the context of the Coase Theorem may
lead to the wrong result. Suppose that most people regard the change as
fair, but it turns out that the cost of adjudicating the new law, perhaps
because of the difficulty in determining the magnitude of harm avoided,
is so great that the change is not efficient and is not desired. An analysis
of the legal change according to the Coase Theorem, where the
individuals are in an initial position, fails to take into account these
administrative costs and wrongly concludes that the change is efficient.3
The authors also analyze judicial consideration of non-economic
values. In particular they consider the Peevyhouse case.32 They fault the
court for not considering the value to the landowner of "requiring the
restoration of the landowners' property," in short for not demonstrating
empathy with the landowners who valued the appearance of the land.33
The value of restoration, however, is an economic good, notwithstanding
that Swygert and Yanes assume this value to be much greater than the
29. Even if the actual position is one in which individuals know beforehand whether they will
gain or lose, the initial position adds nothing to the analysis. Again, we cannot say that were these
individuals to bargain in an initial position, they would arrive at a solution requiring compensation to
the deserving person unless we can assume that individuals regard compensation as fair.
30. KH efficiency assumes away declining marginal utility of income, but the definition of
efficiency can be and sometimes is easily expanded to account for the assumption. See Zerbe &
Dively, supra note 16, at 98.
31. Similarly, in cases of gratuitous promises inducing reliance, there is no need to resort to an
initial position to determine fairness; it is efficient to prevent wasteful reliance.
32. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
33. Swygert and Yanes say the court was unable "to stand in the shoes of both parties." Swygert
& Yanes, supra note 1, at 323. This is, however, a claim that the court was not impartial, not that
bargaining in the initial position was at issue. Indeed the actual bargain called for restoration.
Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111.
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fall in the market price of the land.34 The Swygert and Yanes argument
must be, simply, that the result in Peevyhouse is inefficient.
Swygert and Yanes also find a discrepancy between fairness and
efficiency arising where disparity of bargaining power exists.
Discrepancies in bargaining power are, however, notoriously difficult to
define economically other than as arising in the presence of monopoly or
monopsony. Most of the cases that find a bargaining power disparity are
not instances of monopoly or monopsony.5 Swygert and Yanes see the
need to apply non-efficiency considerations only in non-competitive
situations. Competition is, however, neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition to a finding of outcomes that offend the public conscience. For
example, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,36 one of the most
noted unconscionability cases, no one, as far as I am aware, has
suggested that Walker-Thomas had monopoly power.
The problem with an unconscionability case is how to decide when it
is an unconscionability case.37 Swygert and Yanes suggest that the
bargain was too one-sided and that the contract gave Walker-Thomas
more collateral than it needed. 3' This is, however, just an allegation that
the contract was inefficient. They suggest that the result would be
different if both parties were bargaining in an initial position. Swygert
and Yanes thus change the question from one of determining
unconscionability to one in which they must ask how to decide when the
initial position is the correct analytic viewpoint. It is unclear there is any
gain from moving from the first to the second question.
If Walker-Thomas, operating in a competitive industry, had more
collateral than necessary in the instance involving Mrs. Williams, there
34. The discrepancy between the cost of restoration and the fall in the value of the land suggests
that the landowners had peculiar tastes if restoration was really worth that much to them and not to
potential buyers.
35. Talbott has shown that Rawls's approach does not work for certain types of cases thought to
contain unconscionable exculpatory clauses. W.J. Talbott, Cost Spreading and Benefit Spreading in
Tort Law, 11 Res. L. & Econ. 25 (1988).
36. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964). In this case, a single mother with seven children and limited
education purchased many household items from Walker-Thomas Furniture Company over a six-
year period under an installment plan. The contract provided that if an account was not paid in full,
all items would be forfeited. Walker-Thomas reclaimed all of the items even though the total balance
due was $678. Id. at 915-16.
37. Note that if we do not assume declining marginal utility of income then the Swygert and
Yanes approach fails to suggest anything wrong with the original contract, absent inefficiency.
38. If Walker-Thomas were claiming too large a collateral, both parties would be served by a
change in contract.
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may have been other instances of repossession in which collateral was
too small to cover the loss, so it is unclear that the contract was
inefficient if only the bargaining parties are involved. Nevertheless we
may not wish the "Mrs. Williamses" to bear the burden that these
contracts impose. We may wish to limit the extent of collateral that may
be offered even though some people may be harmed by being unable to
secure credit. If our WTP for this change in contract provision is
sufficiently large, then it is efficient to offer greater protection to the
"Mrs. Williamses." The regard of others is the way to distinguish
Walker-Thomas from the earlier example of Bill Gates and the
gardener.39
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither Kaldor-Hicks nor Pareto efficiency rises above the sentiments
of their times. They rest on the actual sentiments of society. These
sentiments recognize existing rights as extant. These concepts of
economic efficiency would have judges accept as starting points well-
settled rules and rights.40 In considering changes in rights at the margin,
these sentiments should govern. Truly efficient results accord with the
notions of fairness imbedded in culture. The initial position is a device
for thinking about fairness when fundamental principles or rights are at
stake, that is, in considering constitutional questions. The suggestion that
judges should think of parties before the law as being in initial positions
may in fact be unfair.
A benefit cost framework that incorporates equity as a good holds
more promise for incorporating equity and efficiency in a practical way
than does the approach of Swygert and Yanes. It grounds the integration
in the actual world and not in the world of zero transaction costs and the
initial position. It relies on an established technique, and it frames the
questions correctly even where answers are unclear."
39. See supra p.352.
40. See Paul Heyne, The Foundations of Law and Economics: Can the Blind Lead the Blind?,
11 Res. L. & Econ. 53, 59 (1988). Perhaps Swygert and Yanes contemplate situations in which
judges would rise above the sentiment of the times and appeal to more advanced moral ideas. Yet
what these more advanced ideas might be remains unclear.
41. I have introduced this method elsewhere. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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